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Terrorism is a salient risk source in 21st century life and may deter tourists from visiting
certain destinations. How people perceive the risk of a future terror attack abroad, and
thus their traveling decisions, may be influenced by whether they think about the future in
specific and personal terms (episodic future thinking) or in more general, abstract terms
(semantic future thinking). In a pre-registered experiment (N = 277) we explored the
potential impact of episodic future thinking on the perceived risk of terror attacks abroad.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) An episodic future
thinking-condition, where participants were asked to imagine a specific, terror-related
personal episode that might occur in the future while traveling abroad; (2) a semantic
future thinking-condition, where participants were asked to think more abstractly about
terror events that might occur in the future; (3) an episodic counterfactual thinking-
condition, where participants were asked to imagine a specific, terror-related personal
episode that might have occurred in the past while traveling abroad and (4) a passive
control condition. Participants indicated their perceived risk of six different future terror
attacks occurring abroad. The manipulation checks suggest that the experimental
manipulations functioned as intended. Contrary to the central hypothesis of the study,
there were no differences in the perceived risk of terror attacks between the conditions.
These results run counter to previous research and do not support the idea that how
people think about the future influences their perceived risk of future dramatic events.
Potential limitations and implications are discussed.
Keywords: episodic future thinking, episodic foresight, future thinking, risk perception, terror risk, perceived risk,
tourism, open science
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is a salient threat in modern life. Although recent years has seen a decrease in the number
of people killed in terror attacks, there has been an increase in the number of civilians killed and
the number of countries affected by terrorism (Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2018).
Realistically, the most fatal terrorist attacks occur in a limited number of countries, most of which
are active conflict zones. However, there have also been several terror attacks targeting tourism
hotspots in the last few years, including an armed assault at a nightclub in Istanbul (Turkey), a
suicide bombing at a concert in Manchester (United Kingdom), and a van attack in Barcelona
(Spain; Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2018).
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Research suggests that tourists worry little about terror attacks
and do not perceive them as very risky compared to other
hazards (i.e., Wolff and Larsen, 2016, 2017). However, several
studies suggest that the perceived risk of terrorism may act
as a travel deterrent, meaning that how people perceive terror
events is important to consider if we wish to understand
their decision making (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998a,b; Gray and
Wilson, 2009; Larsen, 2011). Psychological research may inform
our understanding of how people are affected by terrorism,
particularly the psychological processes involved in individuals’
perception of past and future terror attacks, and the cognitive,
affective, and behavioral effects of these perceptions.
Perceived risk describes our perception of the probability of
negative outcomes weighted by their magnitude. In other words,
perceived risk has both an uncertainty aspect (the probability
of the future event) and a severity aspect (the magnitude of the
future event; Brun, 1994; Wolff and Larsen, 2017). Some studies
indicate that different hazards may act as deterrents to travel,
and several studies suggest an association between risk perception
and travel intentions, in the sense that people generally have
weaker intentions to visit destinations that are perceived as
riskier (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998a,b; Gray and Wilson, 2009).
Studies on related concepts such as perceived threat suggest
that the relationship between perceived risk and behavior might
depend on whether risk is assessed as the risk to oneself or the
general/national risk, with a stronger association for perceived
personal risk (Huddy et al., 2002; Goodwin et al., 2005). Although
some studies have found no relationship between the perceived
risk of terrorism and intentions to travel (i.e., Floyd et al., 2004),
the overall trend seems to suggest that risk perception may
influence decisions.
Risk perception is also an important driving force in the social
and economic consequences of risk events. Based on the social
amplification of risk framework (Kasperson et al., 1988), it can
be argued that a collective increase in perceived risk can result
in severe secondary impacts, for example in terms of negatively
impacting the local tourism industry. The main idea is that risk
perception functions as the mechanism through which a risk
event has social and economic consequences. In this description,
risk perception functions as one of several signals containing
information about the risk event and serves as an antecedent
to risk-related behavior, culminating in widespread secondary
consequences (Kasperson et al., 1988). This, in combination with
the aforementioned implications for travel decisions, solidifies
the importance of understanding the influences on how people
perceive terrorism risk and suggests that exploring potential
antecedents to perceived risk is important to enhance our
understanding of psychological factors influencing tourists’ travel
decisions and behavior.
Several studies have explored psychological antecedents to risk
perception. For example, it seems that people’s recollection of
prior risk estimates can be influenced by their current beliefs, so
they remember seeing the world as safer than they actually did
(Fischhoff et al., 2005). Other predictors of perceived risk include
certain individual characteristics, such as openness to change and
hedonism, where greater openness is associated with reduced
perceived risk and greater hedonism with increased perceived
risk. Additional predictors include situational characteristics
such as the way that information is framed, where some
frames are assumed to be risk attenuating (Kapuściński and
Richards, 2016). Experimental studies on risk perception, such
as studies on the impact of news framing on perceived risk
for terror attacks (Kapuściński and Richards, 2016), and studies
exploring how characteristics of terror attacks influence perceived
risk (e.g., Wolff and Larsen, 2017), are necessary to establish
causal relationships between predictors of risk perception and
risk perception.
One potential predictor of perceived risk that can be
manipulated experimentally is episodic future thinking (EFT).
Foremost, EFT is a form of future-oriented cognition that
concerns specific, plausible, personal episodes (Atance and
O’Neill, 2001). This differs from semantic future thinking (SFT),
which is future-oriented and may be personal, but which
concerns a general, non-specific future (Abraham et al., 2008;
see Szpunar et al., 2014, for a taxonomy of future-oriented
cognition). Just as our episodic memory allows us to re-
experience our past, EFT allows us to pre-experience a specific,
personal event before it occurs (Atance and O’Neill, 2001;
Szpunar, 2010). For example, a person can remember what it was
like to stroll the beaches of Sicily last summer, and also imagine
what it will be like to go swimming in Crete next year.
We mentally construct our own futures using both episodic
and semantic memories, an ability that confers a tremendous
adaptive advantage, particularly by strengthening our decision-
making capabilities (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997; Addis
et al., 2007; Klein, 2013). Envisioning future episodes evidently
makes it possible to alleviate delay discounting, the general
tendency to prioritize immediate, smaller rewards over future,
larger rewards (Daniel et al., 2015; Bulley et al., 2016; Stein
et al., 2018). For example, if people tend to prioritize spending
money immediately as opposed to saving it for a vacation, EFT
about said vacation might strengthen their ability to take future
outcomes into account, and thus enhance long-term decision
making. Much of the research on EFT is centered around this
relationship with intertemporal decision making (Miloyan and
McFarlane, 2019). Furthermore, a large number of the studies
on EFT have emphasized simulations of positive future episodes
(see Calluso et al., 2019, for a notable exception). However, EFT
might also be important for decision making in other areas,
and through other mechanisms, particularly when imagining
potential negative future episodes.
While vividly imagining positive future episodes might allow
us to prioritize bigger, delayed rewards over smaller, immediate
rewards, imagining negative personal futures might help us
prepare for potential adverse outcomes (Miloyan et al., 2014,
2016). For example, people planning their next holiday trip might
not only see themselves Scooba diving or hiking, they may also
imagine themselves experiencing a natural disaster or a terror
attack, and thus perceive the risk of this hazard as greater than
they would otherwise. This would probably impact the person’s
intentions to travel and potentially their actual travel decisions.
Based on several studies suggesting that people frequently engage
in EFT in daily life (D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Barsics et al., 2016),
it is reasonable to assume that they may also think about future,
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personal episodes abroad when making vacation choices. There
are both empirical and theoretical reasons for assuming that EFT
may be associated with increased travel-related risk perceptions,
which would be one way in which this form of future thinking
influences tourists’ decision making.
Some speculate that EFT influences our decisions through
providing information about the affective desirability of future
outcomes and the possibility that these outcomes may occur
(Bulley et al., 2016). Specifically, a person imagining a
potential future event (like enjoying a forthcoming vacation or
experiencing a terror attack in a foreign country) will anticipate
certain emotions if this event comes to fruition and will also
evaluate the event for its likelihood of occurrence. Supporting
this, some studies suggest that imagining personal future episodes
multiple times may heighten the perceived probability that the
imagined events will occur (Szpunar and Schacter, 2013). One
possibility is that EFT can influence decisions in a broader way
than previously considered, by not only providing information
about affective desirability, but providing information about the
severity of future outcomes on a broader scale. If so, there are
grounds for assuming that EFT might also guide our decisions
through affecting how we perceive risk. By mentally experiencing
a future threat, we may be more convinced about its severity
and probability of occurrence, and thus perceive the threat as
riskier. Thus, we argue that thinking about personal exposure to
future terror attacks may increase how risky people perceive such
attacks to be. Several mechanisms explaining this phenomenon
are conceivable.
One mechanism that could explain why EFT might increase
risk perception is the fact that EFT more than SFT may increase
availability, i.e., the ease and vividness with which an event comes
to mind. It is well known that events that come to mind easily
(high availability) and with great vividness are judged more likely
and hence more risky (Slovic et al., 1981; Visschers et al., 2012).
Therefore, a person having a vivid imagination of a potential
future event might judge the risk of the event occurring as higher
because of the increased availability. For example, a tourist vividly
imagining experiencing a possible natural disaster or act of terror
might have this more available when making judgments about the
risk of such an event, and thus perceive the risk as greater than
they would otherwise. As EFT is defined through an increased
specificity and vividness, it is conceivable that this form of future
thinking will lead people to perceive the risk of the event as
greater than the more abstract and general way of thinking about
the future that characterizes SFT.
Another explanation could be that EFT decreases the
psychological distance with which people view future terror
attacks. Psychological distance describes the subjective, perceived
remoteness of an event, and is commonly understood as
consisting of four domains: spatial distance, temporal distance,
social distance and hypotheticality (Trope and Liberman, 2010;
Zwickle and Wilson, 2013). A number of studies suggest that
EFT helps us consider consequences which are psychologically
distant (Daniel et al., 2015; Bulley et al., 2016; Stein et al., 2018).
Furthermore, psychological distance is related to risk perception,
in the sense that events perceived as psychologically proximal
are also perceived as riskier (Zwickle and Wilson, 2013). If people
view terror attacks as psychologically distant, for example in
terms of spatial distance, EFT could possibly decrease the
perceived distance and thus increase the perceived risk. For
example, potential tourists could perceive acts of terror as
spatially distant when planning their vacation but imagining
personally experiencing a terror attack in the future might reduce
this perceived distance, and thus increase perceived risk.
A third rationale for assuming that EFT will increase perceived
risk compared to SFT is the importance of personal experience
in explaining perceived risk (Weber, 2006; Van der Linden,
2015). Several studies suggest that recent experience with a
hazard increases the perceived risk of this hazard, usually by
reducing the psychological distance with which this hazard is
perceived. EFT may serve as a substitute for personal experience
in a way in which SFT does not, and episodic simulations may
be attributed approximately similar evidentiary value as actual
experience (Kappes and Morewedge, 2016). Assuming that EFT
may function as a substitute for personal experience in impacting
decision making, there are clear reasons for assuming that EFT
will heighten perceived risk as compared to SFT. Evidently,
there are several highly plausible explanations for why there
may be a connection between engaging in EFT and perceiving
the risk of a future outcome as higher. As discussed above
these include increased vividness and availability for the event,
decreased psychological distance to the event, and vicariously
experiencing the event.
Some prior studies have been conducted on future-oriented
imagination and perceived probability (i.e., Sherman et al.,
1985), finding that outcomes which are easy to imagine are also
perceived as more probable; however, the future thinking has not
been specific in place or in time, and the studies have typically
focused on perceived probability as opposed to perceived risk.
Some more recent studies have highlighted relationships between
EFT and perceived probability (Szpunar and Schacter, 2013),
and the implications of EFT on risk taking (e.g., Bulley et al.,
2019). However, there are a very limited number of studies on the
association between the simulation of specific, future, personal
episodes and risk perception.
We are aware of only one study exploring the implications of
EFT on how people perceive the risk of hazards (Lee et al., 2018).
Lee and colleagues explored the possibility that EFT might impact
the perceived risk of environmental challenges, and thus also have
an impact on environmental behavior. EFT about possible future
environmental challenges was found to predict environmentally
friendly behavior, an effect that was mediated by the perceived
risk of these challenges. However, the authors operationalized
perceived risk using a measure of perceived probability, and
it is not clear whether this effect extends to risk perception,
as lay peoples’ risk perceptions suffer from probability neglect.
This means that they almost exclusively rely on severity and
ignore probability when judging risk (Sunstein, 2002; Slovic and
Peters, 2006). Furthermore, it is an open question whether EFT
would have a comparable impact on the perceived risk of future
terror attacks as environmental challenges, as these are different
hazards, necessitating further empirical research.
Based on an assumption that EFT might be consequential
for perceived risk, we argue that whether people think about
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the possibility of future terrorism in episodic or semantic terms
might impact how they perceive the risk of terrorism. To
our knowledge, this issue has not been explored in previously
published research, and seeing as risk perception may impact
tourist decisions, exploring such research questions may have
important implications for understanding human behavior. This
is also a good example of how concepts which are important
in mainstream psychology, specifically EFT, can be applied
in investigating a tourist-relevant concept, in this case how
the perceived risk of terror attacks occurring abroad may
influence tourists’ travel decisions. Specifically, we conducted
an experimental study exploring whether participants thinking
about the future episodically perceived the risk of future terror




To assess whether episodic future thinking can increase
the perceived risk of future terror attacks, we conducted a
pre-registered experimental study with four conditions: (1)
an episodic future thinking-condition (EFT-condition), (2) a
semantic future thinking-condition (SFT-condition), (3) an
episodic counterfactual thinking-condition (ECT-condition) and
(4) a passive control condition. In the EFT-condition participants
were asked to imagine a specific, personal episode in the future.
The episodic counterfactual-thinking condition had identical
instructions, with the exception that participants were asked to
imagine that the event could have taken place in the past, based
on a memory of sitting in a restaurant while abroad. Participants
in the SFT-condition were asked to think about the future in
an abstract, impersonal way. Specifically, participants were asked
to think about three examples of terror events that could occur
abroad in the future.
The main argument for using an additional episodic condition
to the EFT-condition is that it helps establish whether the
effect is specific to episodic future thinking or is an effect of
episodic thinking more generally (Hollis-Hansen et al., 2019). As
there is reason to believe that participants have not experienced
comparable personal, past events to an imagined, future terror
attack, episodic counterfactual thinking (ECT) was deemed a
suitable condition to explore whether the potential effect of EFT
was isolated to EFT or generalizable to other forms of episodic
thinking. ECT concerns specific episodes which did not, but
could have, occurred in the past (Epstude and Roese, 2008; De
Brigard and Parikh, 2019). Similar to the distinction between
EFT and SFT, it is possible to distinguish between episodic and
semantic counterfactual thinking (De Brigard and Parikh, 2019).
Imagining what would have happened if you had missed your
flight would be an example of ECT, whereas imagining what the
world would be like without cruise ships would be an example of
semantic counterfactual thinking.
The experiment was conducted as an online survey
experiment using Qualtrics. The study was pre-registered prior
to data collection (online pre-registration at https://osf.io/f4s9r).
Full descriptions of the instructions in the experimental
conditions, the procedure used in the study and a summary of
the deviations from the pre-registration are available at https:
//osf.io/ygptx/?view_only=7861eaaf164646d0a4682d5018c3d38.
The data are available at the aforementioned webpage, and as
Supplementary Data Sheet S1.
Hypotheses for this study pertained both to the manipulation
checks and the effect of future thinking on perceived risk.
Hypotheses for the manipulation checks: (1) Participants
assigned to both the EFT-condition and the ECT-condition
will have a higher mean score than participants assigned to
the SFT-condition on the index of vividness, the index of
visual perspective and the item measuring feeling of mentally
experiencing the imagined event. (2) Participants in the EFT-
condition and the SFT-condition will have mean scores above
the midpoint (4.0) on the item measuring the degree of future
thinking. Similarly, participants in the ECT-condition will have
mean scores above the midpoint (4.0) on the item measuring the
degree of counterfactual thinking.
Main hypothesis: Participants assigned to an EFT-condition
will have a higher mean rank value on the index of perceived risk
of terror attacks than participants assigned to an ECT-condition,
an SFT-condition and a passive control condition.
Sample and Procedure
Sample Size Calculation
We used G∗Power (Version 3.1.9.4) to conduct a power analysis
to calculate sample size for the analyses testing the main
hypotheses (Mann–Whitney U post hoc tests, described in the
analysis section). The expected effect size is based on effects
found in prior research (e.g., Wolff and Larsen, 2017; Lee et al.,
2018; effect size d = 0.5, alpha level = 0.0167, power = 0.80,
logistic distribution), suggesting a minimal sample size of 264 to
achieve sufficient power. Although there is a limited number of
prior studies, making the estimate vulnerable to influence from
sampling error (Schäfer and Schwarz, 2019), several studies using
EFT as the independent variable have found effects larger than the
conventional medium effect of 0.5 (see Hollis-Hansen et al., 2019,
for a mini-review). This suggests that there are ample grounds for
assuming an effect of at least a medium size. To compensate for
some potential participants dropping out of the study we aimed
to recruit 275 participants.
Sample
Two hundred and seventy seven participants (63 men, 214
women) were recruited using the Citizen lab administered by the
Digital Social Science Core Facility, University of Bergen, and
through recruitment of students at the Faculty of Psychology,
University of Bergen. Students at the Faculty of Psychology were
recruited using flyers at the campus, and through recruitment in
lectures. We deviated from the pre-registration in this respect,
as we were unable to recruit a sufficient number of participants
through the Citizen lab, which necessitated recruitment of
additional participants through other means. Participants had an
average of 2.58 years of higher education (SD = 2.15). Age was
not registered in order to secure the anonymity of all participants
(mentioned in the ethics statement below).
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Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions with simple
randomization using the randomizer function in Qualtrics. This
means that every participant had an equal chance (25%) to be
assigned to one of four blocks, each block representing one of the
four conditions.
Participants arrived at the Citizen Lab or at a data lab at
the Faculty of Psychology and were informed that the study
they were about to participate in focused on how people think
about terror attacks. Thereafter, they were seated at individual
desks. They read an introductory statement for the study and
indicated their informed consent. Following this, they were asked
to indicate their gender and how many years of higher education
they had. Subsequently, the participants in the three experimental
conditions were exposed to the experimental induction, whereas
participants in the control condition (n = 55) only answered
questions pertaining to their perceived risk of terror.
In the EFT-condition (n = 65), participants were asked
to imagine a specific, personal episode in the future. The
instructions asked participants to vividly imagine that they
are sitting in a restaurant while on a vacation abroad, and
that they suddenly hear explosions and shooting close by.
Thereafter, they were asked to imagine further development
of the dramatic situation. The episodic counterfactual-thinking
condition (n = 77) had identical instructions, with the exception
that participants were asked to imagine that the event could
have taken place in the past, based on a memory of sitting
in a restaurant while on vacation abroad. Participants in the
SFT-condition (n = 80) were asked to think about the future
in an abstract, impersonal way. Specifically, participants were
asked to think about three examples of terror events that could
occur abroad in the future. The specific scenarios in the EFT-
condition and the ECT-condition were based on the most
frequent terror attacks in the last 20 years reported in the Global
Terrorism Index (Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2018).
A full description of the wording used in the experimental
manipulations can be found in the OSF-folder for this study1.
After the experimental manipulation, participants answered
the manipulation checks and the questions measuring potential
covariates. Thereafter, they answered questions pertaining to
their perceived risk of terror, before finally being given a written
debrief describing the purposes of the study in full.
Measures
Demographic Measures
Gender was measured with three categories (1 = male, 2 = female,
3 = do not wish to report gender). Years of education was
measured using one item, How many years of higher education
have you completed?
Manipulation Checks
As per the norm in the field we included phenomenological
measures to assess participants’ experience of their thought
content (Miloyan and McFarlane, 2019). A strong argument for
using phenomenological, self-report measures as manipulation
1https://osf.io/ygptx/?view_only=7861eaaf164646d0a4682d5018c3d383
checks on participants’ thinking is that participants may have
better access to their own mental processes than external
observers (Miloyan and McFarlane, 2019; Miloyan et al., 2019).
An index of vividness was constructed from the following
three 7-point Likert-type items, with endpoints 1 (completely
disagree) and 7 (completely agree): I imagined one specific
event, my thoughts were vivid, my thoughts were concrete.
The scores on the index had moderately satisfactory internal
consistency (α = 0.73).
Counterfactual/future thinking was measured using one item
on a scale from 1 to 7, with endpoints 1 (completely disagree)
and 7 (completely agree). EFT and SFT-condition: I thought
about the future. ECT-condition: I thought about an alternative
to something that happened in the past.
Feeling of mentally experiencing the event(s) was measured
with one item on a scale from 1 and 7, with endpoints 1
(completely disagree) and 7 (completely agree). EFT- and SFT-
condition: I was taken forward in time to when the event(s) might
take place. ECT-condition: I was taken back in time to when the
event could have taken place.
Visual perspective was measured using the following three 7-
point Likert-type items, with endpoints 1 (completely disagree)
and 7 (completely agree): I experienced the event as if I observed
myself from the outside (reversed), I experienced the event through
my own eyes, I experienced the event as if I was not present
myself (reversed). In the SFT-condition, visual perspective was
measured with the same three items, using the word “events”
instead of “event.” We had a pre-registered plan to construct
an index of visual perspective using these three items. However,
the scores had unsatisfactory internal consistency (α = 0.57).
Thus, differing from the pre-registration, field perspective and
observer perspective were analyzed separately, and we did not
analyze the third item.
Covariates
The following concepts were measured using one-item scales
with endpoints 1 (completely disagree) and 7 (completely agree).
Judged realism: the imagination of the event was realistic.
Subjective difficulty of generating a scenario: it was easy to
perform the task where I was asked to imagine an event(s).
Perceived temporal distance: when you imagined the event(s), how
far away in time did you perceive it(them) to be? Time spent on
imagining either future episodes or counterfactual episodes or
thinking about future semantic events, was measured in seconds
using a timing question in Qualtrics.
Dependent Variable
It is important, when exploring potential antecedents of
perceived risk, to operationalize the concept in a way that
reflects our conceptual understanding of the components of risk
perception, seeing as certain factors may influence perceived
probability or perceived severity selectively. We measured the
perceived risk of terror using an index composed of six items for
different forms of terror. For all items, participants were asked
to indicate their perceived risk of terror attacks abroad. Only
the index was used for the pre-registered analyses. Specifically,
participants were asked the following questions: How do you
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2333
fpsyg-10-02333 October 18, 2019 Time: 19:3 # 6
Bø and Wolff A Terrible Future
perceive the risk of a bomb explosion at a public place/a biological
terrorist attack/a chemical terrorist attack/a terror-related car
attack/an armed terrorist attack/the hijacking of a flight? All items
were on a scale from 1 to 7, with endpoints 1 (not risky) and
7 (very risky). The scores on the index had excellent internal
consistency (α = 0.89). For terrorism in general, participants were
asked how they perceive the risk of being exposed to terrorism,
on a scale from 1 to 7 with endpoints 1 (not risky) and 7 (very
risky). All alpha values mentioned in this methods section were
interpreted in relation to Ponterotto and Ruckdeschel (2007).
Ethics Statement
This work complied with the general guidelines for research
ethics by the Norwegian National Committees for Research
Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH). The
data were not covered by the Norwegian Personal Data Act,
and thus this project was exempt from submitting a formal
application to the Data Protection Official for Research. Also, as
the study did not include research questions related to health,
there was no requirement to formally apply to the Regional
Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics, as the
study was not covered by the Norwegian Health Research Act.
Participants marked their informed consent before participation,
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical
Association, 2013). As age could be a potential identifier for the
participants in the Citizen lab administered by the Digital Social
Science Core Facility, the age of participants was not included
as a demographic question. The participants received a written




All analyses were run using IBM SPSS [Version 25]. For
several of the analyses involving the index of perceived risk,
our pre-registration notes that we planned to conduct non-
parametric tests. Specifically, we planned to conduct a Kruskal–
Wallis omnibus test for overall group differences, with Mann–
Whitney U post hoc tests. We also planned to analyze the
relationship between the potential covariates and risk perception
using Spearman correlation coefficients. This was based on
prior research and pilot testing suggesting that the scores
would be highly skewed. However, the distribution was a
much closer approximation to a normal distribution than we
thought it would be. As such, we opted for the more powerful
parametric tests (specifically, Pearson correlation as opposed
to Spearman correlation for some of the manipulation check
analyses, and one-way ANOVA as opposed to Kruskal–Wallis for
the main analysis).
To analyze differences on the manipulation check items in the
three experimental conditions, we ran three one-way between-
subject ANOVAs. Any significant differences were followed up
with independent t-tests. For the items measuring future thinking
and counterfactual thinking, we used three one-sample t-tests
2https://osf.io/ygptx/?view_only=7861eaaf164646d0a4682d5018c3d383
to compare the obtained scores in the EFT-condition, the ECT-
condition and the SFT-condition with the scale midpoint (4.0).
To explore relationships between the potential covariates
and the dependent variable (i.e., terror risk perceptions), we
computed Pearson coefficients between scores on each of the
four potential covariates (time spent on the task, judged realism,
subjective difficulty of generating a scenario, and perceived
temporal distance) and scores on the index of perceived risk.
For the main analysis (the effect of experimental condition on
perceived risk), we ran a one-way between-subjects ANOVA with
experimental condition as the between-subjects factor.
Data Exclusion and Missing Values
Outliers were defined using the MAD-median rule (Wilcox,
2012). Outliers were assessed separately for each condition, as
grouped data were used in the analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell,
2014). Unless otherwise reported, there were no outliers for the
variables used in the analyses. Where there were outliers, these
were retained in analyses, and all the analyses involving scores
with outliers were run both with and without the outliers (Howitt
and Cramer, 2011). Any differences in results are noted. As there
were no missing data we excluded cases analysis-by-analysis in
SPSS (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014).
Main Results
Preliminary Analyses
The distribution of gender was not significantly different
depending on condition, χ2(1,N = 277) = 1.86, p = 0.60,
ϕ = 0.08. The scores on the higher education variable were not
significantly different depending on condition, F3,274 = 0.12,
p = 0.95, η2 = 0.001. This did not change when outliers were
excluded, F3,251 = 0.66, p = 0.58, η2 = 0.008. Thus, conditions
were comparable on demographic variables.
Manipulation Checks
As predicted, there was a significant difference on the index of
vividness depending on condition, F2,220 = 29.82, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.22. Participants in the EFT-condition (M = 5.56, SD = 1.00)
and the ECT-condition (M = 5.65, SD = 0.90) reported a
significantly higher degree of vividness than participants in the
SFT-condition (M = 4.49, SD = 1.19). Both comparisons showed
an estimated large effect size (Table 1). Participants in the EFT-
condition did not have a significantly different vividness score
from participants in the ECT-condition.
As predicted, there was a significant difference on the feeling
of mentally experiencing the event depending on condition,
F2,220 = 9.02, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.08. This did not change when
outliers were excluded, F2,211 = 27.50, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21.
Participants in the EFT-condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.62) and
participants in the ECT-condition (M = 5.18, SD = 1.67) reported
mentally experiencing the event to a significantly higher degree
than participants in the SFT-condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.76).
However, controlling for an increased probability of type 1 error
with multiple comparisons using a non-registered Bonferroni
correction implies adjusting the alpha value from 0.05 to 0.0167.
While significant with the uncorrected alpha value, the difference
between the EFT-condition and the SFT-condition was no longer
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TABLE 1 | Independent t-tests comparing scores on phenomenological measures
in the three experimental conditions.
Measure t df p d 95% CI
EFT vs. SFT




2.14 143 0.03 0.36 [0.05, 1.17]
Field perspective 3.70a 142.62 <0.001 0.61 [0.58, 1.91]
ECT vs. SFT




4.18 155 <0.001 0.66 [0.60, 1.69]
Field perspective 4.22 155 <0.001 0.67 [0.75, 2.07]
EFT vs. ECT




−1.93 140 0.06 −0.32 [−1.09, 0.13]
Field perspective 0.50 140 0.62 −0.08 [−0.81, 0.48]
EFT, episodic future thinking; SFT, semantic future thinking; ECT, episodic
counterfactual thinking. Using a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, the
alpha-level was adjusted to 0.0167. aCorrected t-value (the assumption of equal
variances was violated).
significant at the corrected alpha value (p = 0.03). Participants in
the EFT-condition did not have a significantly different feeling
of mentally experiencing the event than participants in the ECT-
condition (Table 1).
As scores on the index of visual perspective had lower internal
consistency than expected, we deviated from the pre-registered
analysis plan by analyzing field perspective and observer
perspective separately. Contrary to our predictions, there was
no significant difference in observer perspective depending on
condition, F2,219 = 0.24, p = 0.79, η2 = 0.002. As predicted,
there was a significant difference in field perspective depending
on condition, F2,219 = 11.20, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.09. Participants
in the EFT-condition (M = 5.03, SD = 1.86) and participants in
the ECT-condition (M = 5.19, SD = 1.99) reported a significantly
higher degree of field perspective than participants in the SFT-
condition (M = 3.79, SD = 2.18). Both comparisons showed an
estimated medium-to-large effect size (Table 1). Participants in
the EFT-condition did not have a significantly different degree of
field perspective than participants in the ECT-condition.
Three one-sample t-tests were run to explore the degree
of future/counterfactual thinking in the three experimental
conditions. Participants in the EFT-condition (M = 4.91,
SD = 1.84), the ECT-condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.95) and the
SFT-condition (M = 5.26, SD = 1.51) had higher scores than
the scale midpoint of 4.0 (Table 2), suggesting that participants
were engaged in future thinking in the EFT- and SFT-conditions
and counterfactual thinking in the ECT-condition. The effect
sizes were medium-to-large (Table 2). These results were still
significant when outliers were excluded (Table 2).
Covariates
Perceived risk was not significantly associated with judged
realism (r = 0.05, N = 222, p = 0.45), subjective difficulty of
generating a scenario (r = 0.04, N = 222, p = 0.60), perceived
temporal distance (r = 0.02, N = 222, p = 0.79) or the amount
of time spent on the task (r = −0.13, N = 222, p = 0.06). This
did not change when outliers were excluded (Table 3). As none of
the measured potential covariates were associated with perceived
risk, none were included in the analyses for the effect of future
thinking on perceived risk.
Effect of Episodic Future Thinking on Perceived Risk
As the scores on the dependent variable were more normally
distributed than expected, we deviated from the pre-registration
by using the more powerful one-way ANOVA as opposed to the
planned Kruskal–Wallis test. This also means that we deviated
from the pre-registered main hypothesis, in the sense that a
one-way ANOVA assesses differences in means, rather than the
mean rank value, which is assessed in a Kruskal–Wallis test
(Field and Hole, 2003).
Contrary to our prediction, there was no significant difference
on the index of perceived risk depending on condition,
F3,273 = 2.57, p = 0.06, η2 = 0.03. The mean scores suggest
a trend in the opposite direction of what was predicted in
the pre-registered hypothesis, as the mean score on perceived
risk was higher in the SFT-condition (M = 3.05, SD = 1.27)
than in the EFT-condition (M = 2.67, SD = 1.12), the ECT-
condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.21) and the control condition
(M = 2.64, SD = 1.09). Figure 1 displays the mean scores in
the different conditions. However, when excluding six outliers
on the index of perceived risk, there was a significant overall
difference between the experimental conditions, F3,267 = 2.88,
p = 0.04, η2 = 0.03. As there are no clear grounds for assuming
that the outliers were sampled from a different population than
TABLE 2 | One sample t-tests for scores on future/counterfactual thinking.
Condition Test score t df p d 95% CI
With Outliers Included
EFT 4 3.97 64 <0.001 0.49 [0.45, 1.36]
ECT 4 5.21 76 <0.001 0.59 [0.71, 1.60]
SFT 4 7.94 79 <0.001 0.83 [0.93, 1.60]
Without Outliers
EFT 4 4.28 62 <0.001 0.60 [0.60, 1.47]
ECT 4 9.69 68 <0.001 1.17 [1.30, 1.97]
SFT 4 8.14 78 <0.001 0.92 [0.99, 1.64]
EFT, episodic future thinking; SFT, semantic future thinking; ECT, episodic
counterfactual thinking.













r 0.04 0.007 0.03 −0.10
Perceived
risk
p 0.14 0.92 0.67 0.14
N 206 213 219 206
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the remainder of the scores, the solution with outliers included
was kept (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014). This is also in accordance
with the pre-registered plan to retain outliers in all analyses.
Exploratory Analyses
In a non-registered, exploratory analysis, we explored whether
there was a difference between conditions on the perceived risk
of terror using an index consisting only of the items pertaining
to the situation that participants were asked to simulate (i.e., a
bomb explosion and an armed terror attack). As Levene’s test for
equality of variances was significant (W2,219 = 3.48, p = 0.03),
indicating that the variances in conditions were unequal, Welch’s
F was used. There was no significant difference on this new
index depending on condition, Welch’s F2,145.31 = 2.34, p = 0.10,
η2 = 0.02. This did not change when outliers were excluded,
Welch’s F3,144.95 = 1.47, p = 0.23, η2 = 0.02.
DISCUSSION
Summary
How people perceive the risk of hazards such as terrorism may
be an important factor in how they make decisions. It may
be that tourists who imagine themselves being caught up in
terrorist action at a holiday destination refrain from visiting
such destinations since they perceive the risk of such attacks as
higher than others who merely think of terrorism in abstract
terms. Based on the assumed role of EFT in decision making, and
prior research suggesting a relationship between EFT and risk
perception, we designed an experiment to assess the impact of
future thinking on how people perceive the risk of future terror
attacks. Specifically, our research question was centered around
the relative influence of engaging in EFT in relation to a future,
personal vacation and SFT on the perceived risk of terror attacks.
In a pre-registered hypothesis, we predicted that participants
engaging in EFT in relation to a future terror attack while
on vacation abroad would perceive the risk of terror attacks
as greater than participants asked to think about future terror
attacks in an abstract, impersonal way (SFT) participants asked
to think about an alternative to a specific episode in their past
(episodic counterfactual thinking/ECT) and participants in a
passive control condition. This hypothesis was not supported,
and the direction of the mean difference is the opposite of what
was predicted. Specifically, participants in the EFT-condition did
not perceive the risk of terror attacks as higher than participants
in the other conditions. These results do not support the idea that
whether people engage in EFT or SFT impacts how they perceive
the risk of future terror attacks.
Despite a lack of evidence for an effect of future
thinking on perceived risk, the analyses of differences on
the phenomenological manipulation check measures suggest that
participants engaged in the form of thinking which they were
instructed to. Regarding temporal orientation, participants in
both future thinking-conditions reported that they thought about
the future, and participants in the ECT-condition reported that
they thought about an alternative to something that happened in
the past. Furthermore, participants in both episodic conditions
reported more vivid imaginations, and a greater degree of
field perspective, than participants in the SFT-condition. As
both vividness and field perspective characterize EFT, these
results suggest that the experimental manipulations functioned
as intended (see McCarroll, 2019, for arguments concerning
the importance of observer perspective in EFT). However, it
is worth noting that only participants in the ECT-condition,
but not in the EFT-condition, reported that they mentally
experienced the event to a stronger degree than participants
in the SFT-condition. Autonoetic consciousness, enabling a
person to pre-experience a future, specific event, is argued
to be a chief trademark of mental time travel (Tulving, 1985;
McCarroll, 2019), suggesting that participants may not have
been engaging in EFT. Despite this, the overall results suggest
that participants engaged in the forms of thinking which they
were expected to.
As the manipulation checks suggest that the experimental
manipulations were effective, the lack of a difference in risk
perception between conditions may suggest that perceived
risk does not depend on future thinking. Considering that
EFT is characterized by vividness and perceived psychological
proximity, and that these variables are known to predict an
increased risk perception, this would be puzzling (Slovic et al.,
1981; Zwickle and Wilson, 2013; Daniel et al., 2015; Bulley et al.,
2016; Stein et al., 2018). There are, however, several possible
alternative explanations for why we did not find an effect of EFT
on the perceived risk of future terror attacks. Importantly, this
does not exclude a relationship between EFT and the perceived
risk of other hazards.
Potential Explanations
One could hypothesize that participants in the two episodic
conditions did not consider their imaginations realistic, and thus
had no reason to perceive terrorism as riskier than participants
in the control condition. If an imagined future episode is not
perceived as realistic, there is no reason that it would carry weight
in how people evaluate hazards. However, judged realism did
not correlate with perceived risk, and thus cannot explain the
lack of a difference in perceived risk between conditions. This
is also true for perceived temporal distance and amount of time
spent on the task, neither of which correlated with perceived risk.
Another explanation could be that participants did not perceive
the imagined events as personally relevant; personal relevance has
been identified as an important characteristic of episodic future
thoughts (Szpunar, 2010). However, as prior research suggests
that perceived risk is associated with travel intentions (Sönmez
and Graefe, 1998a,b; Gray and Wilson, 2009), in the sense that
a higher perceived risk is associated with weaker intentions, we
believe that thinking about future terror attack while abroad
would likely be experienced as personally relevant.
One explanation of why EFT did not influence risk perception
is that terror attacks are relatively vivid and easy to imagine in
the first place. Specifically, if people already have vivid and clear
images of how a future terror attack might look like, for example
through exposure on news media or through other forms of
information, imagining a specific, personal event might not make
the event more psychologically proximal or vivid than it already
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FIGURE 1 | Effect of future thinking on the perceived risk of terror.
is, and thus not be considered relevant when evaluating the risk
of a future terror event on a personal vacation. If this is the case,
then episodic future thoughts of hazards may only be relevant
for hazards where people do not have very vivid images of the
hazard to begin with, so that there is an increase in how easy it is
to imagine, and thus also an increase in perceived risk.
In other words: EFT may only increase perceived risk if the
psychological distance that is traversed when imagining the event
is of sufficient magnitude. Therefore, for events which people do
not have vivid scenarios for, such as not previously encountered
consequences of climate change like seasonal changes, the
perceived risk of hazards associated with such events might be
affected by engaging in EFT. Whereas for events which are more
vivid, like frequently broadcasted terror attacks, EFT would not
further increase the perceived risk. This could be equivalent
to the way in which people use vividness in judgments of
probability, for example judging the probability of dying from
highly imaginable causes of death as greater than the probability
of dying from causes of death which are less imaginable but
more likely (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). This may explain why EFT
seems to increase the perceived risk of environmental challenges
(Lee et al., 2018), but did not increase the perceived risk of
terrorism in this study.
One other conceivable explanation as to why there was no
difference in risk perception between the experimental conditions
is that participants focused on different targets while judging
risk. If participants in the two episodic conditions focused on
their own risk, whereas participants in the control condition
focused on the perceived risk for others, participants could have
displayed an optimistic bias, perceiving their own risk of being
exposed to the hazard as lower than the risk of others being
exposed to the same hazard (Weinstein, 1980; Helweg-Larsen and
Shepperd, 2001). Thus, even if there was an effect of EFT on risk
perception, a difference in focus may have canceled any effect of
the experimental manipulation. Although some studies indicate
that the optimistic bias might not be present when evaluating
the perceived risk of terror attacks (Larsen and Brun, 2011),
an optimistic bias could be an explanation of why participants
engaging in EFT did not evaluate the risk of terror attacks as
greater than participants engaging in SFT or participants in a
control condition.
Methodological Considerations
In addition to two future thinking-conditions and a passive
control condition, we opted to include an ECT-condition as an
active control condition (De Brigard and Parikh, 2019). However,
studies on EFT and ECT suggest that repeated simulations of
future thoughts and counterfactuals have differing effects on
perceived probability, in the sense that repeated simulations of
an imagined future event increase the perceived probability that it
will occur, whereas repeated simulations of a past, counterfactual
event reduces the perceived probability of the event (De Brigard
et al., 2013; Szpunar and Schacter, 2013). One could therefore
argue that ECT is ill-suited as an active control condition.
However, the methodological alternative would be to use episodic
recent thinking, in which participants could not be asked to think
about terror attacks, thus introducing the additional confound
of a difference in event type (i.e., participants in the EFT- and
SFT-conditions would have thought about terrorism, whereas
participants in the episodic recent thinking-condition would have
thought about another kind of event).
One methodological consideration is the amount of time spent
in the experimental conditions. In some other studies (i.e., Lee
et al., 2018), the amount of time between conditions has been
equalized, which was not the case in the current study. However,
it is reasonable to assume that engaging in EFT may be more
time intensive than engaging in SFT, suggesting that introducing
experimental constraints on the time spent might be artificial.
Regardless, the amount of time on the task did not predict
perceived risk, suggesting that any difference in the amount of
time spent engaging in future thinking or counterfactual thinking
did not have implications for perceived risk.
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Although our index of the perceived risk of six future terror
attacks produced scores with high internal consistency, there
is no validation evidence besides face validity, which can be
considered insufficient (Meltzoff and Cooper, 2019). However,
as participants were instructed that we were interested in their
opinions, and they were asked to evaluate the perceived risk of the
different forms of future terror attacks, we argue that the answers
likely reflect how participants perceive future terror attacks.
Self-evidently, developing validated, contextualized measures of
relevant future terror attacks to be used to index participants’
perception remains an important goal for future research.
As we deviated from the pre-registration by using a different
analysis to test the central hypothesis of the study, it is also
relevant to assess whether we had sufficient statistical power
to detect a medium difference in a one-way between-subjects
ANOVA. According to a post hoc power-analysis conducted using
G∗Power, we had more than sufficient power to detect an effect
of medium size (N = 277, d = 0.5, power = 0.95). This suggests
that the lack of a difference most likely cannot be attributed to
the total sample size, which increases the explanatory value of the
null finding, as it is unlikely that we found no difference because
of a lack of statistical power. This lends support to the argument
that for the perceived risk of terrorism specifically, there might
not be an effect of EFT.
One important additional methodological consideration is the
unequal distribution of men and women in the sample, with
approximately 77 percent of the sample consisting of women.
Some studies suggest gender differences in risk perception (Hicks
and Brown, 2013), implying that a sample with a more equal
gender distribution might yield different results. However, even
if there are gender differences in the level of perceived risk,
there is no strong argument for assuming that gender may
moderate the relationship between episodic future thinking and
risk perception, and taking into consideration that the gender
balance amongst students, particularly psychology students (the
target population from which we sampled) is unequal (Database
for Statistics on Higher Education, 2019), we argue that this does
not pose a significant threat to the validity of our results.
Open Science and Psychology in Tourism
During the last decade there has been an increased attention to
the importance of methodological stringency and transparency
in medicine, psychology, and other social sciences (Pashler
and Harris, 2012; De Boeck and Jeon, 2018). Pre-registering
studies with a hypothetico-deductive approach to hypothesis
testing is paramount to ensuring that the reliability of
the results is not influenced by the use of questionable
research practices, intentioned or otherwise, and to facilitate
the accumulation of scientific knowledge (van’t Veer and
Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Wicherts et al., 2016). Pre-registering
studies also necessitates a more transparent division between
confirmatory and exploratory hypotheses, which makes it easier
for readers of scientific literature to evaluate the credibility of the
research findings.
The present study is an example of how methodological
improvements which are developing rapidly in the field of
psychology can be a positive influence on the way studies are
conducted in the tourism field more generally. As pre-registered
studies are relatively rare in tourism research, we argue that this
study not only represents a thematically relevant contribution
to furthering the connections between mainstream psychological
research and tourism research, but also a methodological
contribution to achieving the same goal.
Future Research and Implications
As previously mentioned, a plausible explanation of why EFT
may not be important for how people perceive the risk of future
terror attacks is that scenarios of terror attacks are highly vivid,
and thus not easily susceptible to any increase in availability
as a result of engaging in EFT. One way to test whether the
effect of EFT could be moderated by ease of imagination would
be to conduct a study using a factorial design with ease of
imagination as one factor, and EFT versus SFT as the other
factor. This could establish whether there is an interactional
effect between ease of imagination and mode of future thinking
on risk perception, in the sense that EFT only increases risk
perception for scenarios where people initially have difficulty
in imagining the consequences. As such, future research on
the effect of EFT on risk perception may explore whether
the effect is limited to scenarios which people initially have
difficulty in imagining.
As highlighted in recent reviews of EFT-measurement (e.g.,
Miloyan and McFarlane, 2019), there is a shortage of behavioral
measures of EFT in the literature. Given that the adaptive
significance of future thinking can be directly related to
behavior, a reasonable methodological improvement would be
the use of relevant, behavioral measures to assess potential
behavioral implications of any effect of future thinking on
risk perceptions (Suddendorf and Moore, 2011; Miloyan and
McFarlane, 2019). Thus, future research could also assess
whether EFT can influence behavioral outcomes either through
risk perception or other relevant mediators. For example, if
future research shows an effect of EFT on perceived risk,
this could also have implications for how tourists search for
information regarding future destinations, or how they make
actual decisions of which destinations to visit and which
destinations to avoid.
As mentioned above, assessing behavioral outcomes is a
relevant next step using this study as a starting point. If we
assume that risk perception is important in explaining travel
decisions, a future study could explore whether different forms
of future thinking differentially impact travel intentions, or
travel decision making. For example, when choosing between
different destinations which are perceived as risky, it may matter
whether people engage in EFT or SFT for which destination
they choose to travel to (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998b). It
would be possible to explore the relationship between future
thinking and the choice between different risky destinations
and assessing whether such a relationship would be mediated
by perceived risk. If future thinking impacts perceived risk,
which is important in explaining travel decisions, then it
is reasonable to assume that this may be a mechanism
explaining a potential relationship between future thinking and
travel decisions.
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Risk perception is assumed to be important in how people
make decisions and has been shown to be associated with
travel intentions (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998a,b; Gray and
Wilson, 2009), in the sense that a greater perceived risk
might reduce intentions to travel or increase intentions to
stay away. The current results suggest that the way in which
people think about the future may not have an impact on
perceived risk for terror attacks specifically. Regarding perceived
risk, one interpretation of the results is that terrorism as
a hazard may be vivid and experienced as psychologically
proximal enough so as to not be influenced by imagining
specific, personal exposure to terror in the future. Regarding
EFT, the results suggest that the significance of this form
of future thinking on risk perception may be more context-
dependent than previously assumed and may be moderated
by how easy it is to imagine the future hazard before
engaging in the future thinking. This implies that tourist’s
risk perceptions might well be increased by EFT when it
comes to other hazards, possibly including the consequences
of climate change.
CONCLUSION
How people perceive risks is assumed to be important
in explaining their decisions, which makes it important
to gain further knowledge about the antecedents of risk
perception. A pre-registered, experimental study was conducted
to explore EFT as such an antecedent. This was based
on the idea that imagining a personally relevant, specific
future scenario related to terror attacks on a personal
vacation might lead to a higher perceived risk of terror, as
compared to thinking about the future in an abstract way
or thinking about specific episodes that could have occurred
in the past. Contrary to our predictions, there was no
difference in risk perception between conditions. EFT may
still be important for perceived risk, and future research
may help in achieving a more complete understanding of
which factors predict perceived risk. Such results may be
of importance in understanding how people make decisions.
Empirical research on EFT and risk perception for events
abroad is a starting point for what might be a fruitful
interdisciplinary exchange between mainstream psychological
research on future thinking and tourism research on how
people perceive risk.
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